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Abstract—In this short review paper we summarize some of
our recent results on interactive message secrecy for broadcast
erasure channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wireless medium inherently has a broadcast nature.
Many recent results demonstrate that when multiple legitimate
users share a channel there are significant rate benefits to
overhear packets meant for other users [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
However, to make broadcast transmissions maximally useful
for every party, since receivers collect packets meant for other
receivers, serious security questions arise. The basic question
is whether we can keep messages secret from unintended
receivers, while still making use of the broadcast property
for transmission efficiency. Also signals can be overheard by
anyone with a receiving antenna even if we are attempting
to establish a point-to-point link. Therefore the broadcast
property makes it easier for a passive eavesdropper to launch
an attack against the secrecy of the messages.
Our focus in this paper is on giving information-theoretic
security guarantees. The problem of secret communication
over a wiretapped channel has been widely investigated since
Wyner’s seminal paper [1]. It was also observed that a
public discussion channel can significantly improve the rate
of achievable secret communication [2], [3]. We limit our
attention to the case where the public discussion is restricted
to the state-feedback the channel. As pointed out in [4] this
makes a clear distinction between the secret key generation
and secret message sending problem.
Applying ideas from information theory for wireless net-
work security has been a topic which has attracted significant
recent interest (see [13] for a recent survey). The basic
property that is used for most information-theoretically secure
schemes is to utilize (statistical) advantages in the communi-
cation links to legitimate nodes over those experienced by the
eavesdropper (adversary) nodes. These are exploited to give
security against even computationally unbounded adversaries.
Since most results focus on giving security guarantees when
there is some dimension in which the legitimate receiver’s
reception is better than the eavesdropper’s, a natural question
arises on whether we can guarantee such an advantage. A valid
criticism is that such advantages which rely on getting the right
network conditions cannot be guaranteed to occur naturally;
thereby questioning the validity of security guarantees.
In order to address this issue, we made a case in [14]
for a different approach where it is possible to artificially
create an environment, using only dumb interferers, where all
nodes in the network experience (statistically) identical but
independent communication channels. Though this does occur
in several natural (fast fading channel) situations, we cannot
guarantee the benevolence of nature, and hence the attempt
to enhance nature to create this environment. In [14] we
have a preliminary implementation of a wireless security test-
bed with such artificial network conditions has been created.
For such network conditions, there is no statistical advantage
that the legitimate receivers have over the eavesdropper. Then
the only mechanism to create secrecy is to use interaction
(feedback). To further give flexibility for different types of
secrecy guarantees, we use wiretap codes at the physical
layer to artificially create independent message-level erasure
channels. This not only gives design flexibility, but also
enables characterizations for several important special secrecy
requirements.
In this paper we summarize some of our progress on the
following questions:
• What is the maximal rate at which a common key can
be generated between two parties in the presence of an
eavesdropper?
• Assuming one sender and one receiver in the presence of
an eavesdropper, at what rates can a secret message be
conveyed to the receiver?
• Having two or more “honest-but-curious” receivers, how
can we simultaneously maintain secrecy and keep trans-
missions maximally useful?
• How does the secrecy capacity region change if we cannot
trust the feedback of the receivers?
Assuming a broadcast erasure channel model, we provide
exact characterizations for the above problems. We provide
outer bounds for the achievable rates and also simple linear
schemes that meet these bounds.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
A standard point-to-point channel model for wireless com-
munication has been well established as a linear model [15],
where the received signal yj [t] for a node at time t is,
yj [t] =
∑
i∈N
hij [t]xi[t] + zj [t], (1)
where {hij [t]} represent the channel gains from nodes N
transmitting {xi[t]}, and zj [t] is just receiver (Gaussian) noise,
which we will assume to be zero-mean and unit variance
throughout this paper. This model captures both the superposi-
tion and broadcast nature of the wireless channel, since the re-
ceived signal is the (scaled) sum of all transmitted signals and
every transmitted signal affects any receiver. The model (1)
equally applies to both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers.
A significant amount of literature on information-theoretic
security starts with the model in (1) and develops secure
message transmission rates under different assumptions of the
channel models.
In our preliminary work [14], we have built a wireless
testbed where we place a set of “dumb” antennas in a con-
trolled location (like an auditorium or seminar room), which
produce random interfering signals, causing the received signal
at any node at the lth time-block of length T symbols to be
effectively:
y
(l)
j [t] = hAjxA[t] +
∑
i∈I
g
(l)
ij si[t] + zj [t]︸ ︷︷ ︸ezj [t]
, t = 1, . . . , T, (2)
where {g(l)ij } are independent over blocks indexed by l and
independent over receiver nodes j. This implies that different
receivers over time experience independent interference which
are statistically identically distributed. Since the interfering
signals are independent of the information-bearing signal and
are essentially random noise, this causes random independent
variations of the receiver signal-to-noise ratios (SNR). We
emphasize our motivation to create this model is that we
do not know the location of the adversary and so we make
the channels statistically equivalent (though independent at
different locations).
For simplicity1, we will assume that the interference
z˜j [t] have powers that are quantized into S levels, i.e.,
E[|z˜j |2] ∈ {N1, . . . , NS}. This results in S different SNRs
{ PN1 , . . . , PNS }. Thus we have a state-dependent channel
model, where the SNR depends on the interference state
experienced. The probability of the states are determined by
the probability of values taken on by interference z˜j [t], which
in turn is determined by the induced time variations by the
(dumb) interferers.
Connecting signal-level wireless channel to erasures:
Given the channel conditioning described in (2), we can create
physical layer coding schemes to create secrecy. However,
we additionally ask our transmitters to create message-level
erasure channels using physical layer (nested) wiretap codes.
The mechanism to convert the channel variations into erasure
channels using a wiretap code for the the S-state channel is
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1(a) illustrates a wiretap code
using a linear deterministic approximation model [16], how we
can use channel SNR as a mechanism to obscure transmitted
bits. Therefore we can transmit secret messages to a stronger
receiver while effectively “erasing” them from the weaker
receiver. Having multiple levels of signal strength will then
1In principle we can extend this to arbitrary fine quantization, though its
utility will only go up to noise power (which is assumed to be 1).
correspond to multiple messages with a nested structure being
erased (see Figure 1).
Separation architecture: The approach illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 is really a separation architecture for secrecy. In par-
ticular using the channel conditioning of (2), we design the
physical layer (nested) wiretap code to create (multiple-level)
erasure channels, independent and identically distributed for
users. Then, as seen in the review of results in Section III,
we can design interactive secrecy strategies for such erasure
networks. We advocate such an architecture since it enables
two things. One is flexibility, i.e., the physical layer becomes
oblivious to different security requirements; for example the
same physical layer can be used to generate secure keys as
well as message security, as seen in the results of Section III.
Moreover, since the interface is a simple erasure channel,
efficient and scalable (linear) secrecy strategies can be imple-
mented. This modular approach has a basis in the layered IP
network architecture which made the Internet successful. By
perhaps slightly sacrificing the amount of secrecy (if the phys-
ical layer is more intricately designed for particular secrecy
needs) we get benefits in complexity and flexibility2. Therefore
for S-message levels {W1, . . . ,WS}, the separation-based
effectively gives a message-level erasure model, where the
observation Ti for receiver i in state s given by:
Ti = {W1, . . . ,Wl, ?, . . . , ?} if state s = l, (3)
where ? implies “erasure” i.e., the messages {Wl+1, . . . ,WS}
are completely secret from receiver in state l. The erasure
probabilities are influenced the the probability of the state-
dependent model of (2) and the rates of nested messages
determined by the nested wiretap codes.
For simplicity we will focus on S = 2 states, with the
understanding that these techniques can be generalized to
arbitrary number of message-level erasure states. This implies
that for the purposes of this paper, communication takes place
over a 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel. The input alphabet
of the channel consists of all possible vectors of length L
over a finite field Fq . For convenience, we usually call each
such vector a packet. We denote by Xi the ith transmission
over the channel, and by Y1,i, Y2,i, Y3,i the corresponding
outputs observed by the receivers. We use Xn to denote the
vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and similarly for other vectors also.
The broadcast channel is made up of independent component
erasure channels with erasure probabilities δ1, . . . , δK :
Pr {Y1,i, . . . , YK,i|Xi} =
K∏
j=1
Pr {Yj,i|Xi}
2Though there might be some gain by not restricting ourselves to the
separation architecture, in this paper, we focus on such an approach. Our
belief is that the gains are small, since what we ignore are learning the
receiver noises and we focus more on the interference variations which are
much larger. Many ideas of wireless secrecy based on reciprocity of wireless
channels have been proposed [18], [20], [21], [19]. The secrecy rates obtained
by such schemes are much lower than our scheme [14] and ensuring the
channel independence without conditioning the network makes the secrecy
guarantees more vulnerable to criticism.
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Figure 1. Figure (a): Illustration of connection between signal-level wireless channel and erasures using the deterministic model for broadcast. Channel
from Alice to Bob (and Eve) has two states of SNR approximately 15dB and approximately 6dB. This translates to 5 bits and 2 bits for each state (capacity
of log(1 + SNR) translates to roughly 1 bit per 3dB). This is modeled deterministically on the right (see [16] for more details). Therefore if either Bob or
Eve are in the worse state only 2 bits of Alice’s transmission are “visible” to either of them and we can keep 3 bits secret from this state through layered
secure coding for Gaussian channels [17]. Note that both Bob and Eve have independent and identically distributed state sequences and therefore without
feedback/interaction there can be no secrecy. Figure (b): If there are potentially multiple levels of channel SNR that all receivers and eavesdroppers can see,
then we can extend the ideas from Figure 1(a) to multiple levels of secure messages. For example, if all the receivers (including eavesdropper) can have
3 channel SNRs, then we can encode such that only the most insecure message is “visible” at the lowest channel SNR; only the two lowest messages are
visible at moderate SNR and so on. This creates a erasure channel at every message level, with different erasure probabilities.
∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} : Pr{Yj,i|Xi} =
{
1− δj , Yj,i = Xi
δj , Yj =⊥,
where ⊥ is the symbol of an erasure.
Further, we assume that the (erasure) state Si of the channel
during the ith transmission (i.e., which receivers experienced
erasures) is strictly causally available to all parties. The only
exception is when one of the parties is a passive eavesdropper,
in which case we assume that the state of the eavesdropper’s
channel is not part of Si. To make the distinction, we denote
by Zn the eavesdropper’s output and by δE the corresponding
erasure probability.
III. REVIEW OF RESULTS
1) One receiver: First, let us assume a single unicast
session in the presence of a passive eavesdropper [5], [4].
Theorem 1. The secret key generation capacity of the broad-
cast erasure channel with state-feedback is
CSK = δE(1− δ1)L log q. (4)
Theorem 2. The secret message sending capacity of the
broadcast erasure channel with state-feedback is
CSM = δE(1− δ1)1− δ1δE1− δ1δ2E
L log q. (5)
2) Two receivers: Consider a broadcast channel with two
receivers where the sender wants to send independent private
messages each of the receivers; there are no eavesdroppers.
The secrecy requirement is that neither receiver must learn
any information about the message meant for other receiver.
We have the following result [6]:
Theorem 3. The secret message capacity region is the set of
all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ which satisfy the following two
inequalities:
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1 +
R2
1− δ1δ2 ≤ L log q, (6)
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1δ2 +
R2
1− δ2 ≤ L log q. (7)
This capacity region remains unchanged irrespective of
whether the users are honest-but-curious or malicious. See [6]
for precise defintions of these security notions in this context.
Related to the theme of the paper, we also have results on
group key generation both for erasure channels [5], [14] as
well as deterministic channels and Gaussian networks [7].
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